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EXTENSION OF EQUITY JURISDICTION
During comparatively recent times, there has been a
marked extension of the jurisdiction of courts of equity,
both in this country and in England. Technically, of course,
"jurisdiction" means the power to hear and determine, but
here it will be used to denote those subjects of litigation of
which courts of equity take cognizance to the exclusion of
courts of law. The design of this article is to indicate, in
a general way, to what extent equity jurisdiction has been
enlarged and the causes thereof, with brief suggestions of
the recognized benefits and potential perils that have resulted. To do this, it seems necessary, or at least expedient,
to consider the extraordinary powers of equity, to note
those instances in which its jurisdiction is undoubted, those
in which its exercise, though challenged, has been vindicated,
and, lastly, those in which the wisdom of its interference
is open to grave doubt.
First, we consider the quality of equity, which is sometimes defined as being that system of justice administered
by the High Court of Chancery of England by chancellors
appointed by the sovereign and bearing the royal seal. The
origin of these courts is somewhat shrouded in the mists of
history, but it is certain that .they have existed in England
f6r'more than five centuries, and that they were brought
into being by the necessity for justice which the common
law courts, either from the. rigidity of their' forms or.from
'the quality of relief grarited, did hot dff6dl. At the time
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of the inception of courts of chancery, the forms of actions
at law had become so fixed and unbending that, unless a
prospective litigant's cause happened to fall within one of
them, he was barred from even a hearing by formalism
alone. Thus the common law courts, in numberless instances, were inadequate to deliver justice, a sinister fact
widely recognized, except by the common law judges and
the lawyers who practised before them. The situation in
England at this time was a reproach to the very name of
justice.
It is worth while, at this point, to remember that one of
the first duties of sovereignty, of either the kingly or democratic sort, is to administer justice to the people, be they
either subjects or citizens. This duty has been recognized
in all civilized countries. The coronation'oath of the king
binds him to perform that duty, and the first object of our
own government as stated in the preamble to our Constitution is "To establish justice." Likewise, the right of the
people to petition their sovereign for redress of their grievances has long been c6nceded in all civilized lands. It is,
therefore, easy to understand that the people of England
would petition their sovereign for that justice which the
ordinary courts denied. It is equally easy to visualize the
king referring the petitioners to his common law judges, and
of their replying that "the law it inadequate to afford justice, that it is a case of conscience," and that the king would
have a chancellor to decide all questions affecting the royal
conscience, and that this officer should be, as he was for
centuries, an ecclesiastic of the royal household. And,
curiously enough, to this day and in the United States,
courts of equity are universally called "courts of conscience;"
and no suitor may enter them unless he "comes with clean
hands," nor if the courts of law can afford him adequate
relief. Likewise, it causes us no surprise to learn that the
principles of equity are nearly identical with those of the
civil law of Rome in which those ecclesiastics were learned.
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Broadly speaking, what has been said gives an authentic
hint of the rise of the court of chancery in England. The
twin system of justice prevailing in England, common law
and equity, was adopted by our Constitution, and it was
Chancellor Livingstone of New York who administered the
oath to George Washington as the First -President of this
Republic, on April 30, 1789.
The Lords Chancellor of England spoke in the name and
by the authority of their sovereigns and so possessed extraordinary powers. For violation of their orders and decrees,
they could impose fines and imprisonment. They could enjoin the execution of judgments procured by fraud in the
courts of law. So great a power possessed by a single
individual was instantly and vigorously challenged by the
common law bench and bar of England, and the battle
raged for two centuries. Since one of the objections, then
urged against the exercise of such power based only upon
the discretion of the chancellor, is being urged in this country
today, we note the classic example of "The Chancellor's
Foot," from Selden's Table talk, wherein a law serjeant
said:
"Equity is a roguish thing; for law we have a measure, know what
to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one, as if
they should make his foot the standard for the measure we call a Chancellor's foot; what.an uncertain measure would this bel One Chancellor
has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; 'tis
the same thing in the Chancellor's conscience."

In most states of the Union, equity and common law are
administered by the same judge, and it is to the shining
credit of the judiciary that, with occasional exceptions later
to be noted herein, the judges have administered equity
according to its established principles, and not according to
their individual whim and caprice. Only a very few justify
the imputation of the earnest serjeant at law.
Courts of equity, by their decrees, command defendants
to do or to refrain from doing some specific act. As has
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been stated, refusal to obey such orders has constituted
contempt of the court making them, for which the offender
may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both, and there
is no legal limit to the amount of the fine or the duration of
the imprisonment. Such is the law today, and moreover, a
sentence for contempt of court is beyond the reach of
executive clemency, as was illustrated in a recent case in
Indiana. Obviously, in a free country, the possession of
such power alone demands moderation and circumspection
in its exercise, since, otherwise, it would soon be degraded
into an instrument of tyranny. With few exceptions, courts
of equity have confined themselves to the protection of
property rights. Some, however, have invaded the limitless
field of moral behavior, and it is with this novel invasion
that this article is principally concerned.
For purposes of comparison, we here note those subjects
of litigation in which the jurisdiction of equity is well established and its action unchallenged. For example, such
courts, in their decrees requiring affirmative action, may
direct:
That a valid contract be performed specifically where
the legal remedy of damages for its breach would be
inadequate, and the contract is capable of being performed specifically.
That certain agreements, void at law for want of prescribed written formality but so far performed that it
would be inequitable to admit the legal defense, be performed to completion.
That deeds, mortgages or other written instruments be
executed, reformed or cancelled where equitable principles
require.
That land, the legal title to which has been fraudulently
acquired or held, be conveyed to the true owner.
That trust funds or property be delivered to the cestui
que trust.
That conveyances of property made to defraud credit-
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ors be set aside, and the property subjected to the payment of debts of the grantor.
That an insolvent estate be liquidated through a receiver, or agent, appointed by the court.
That where there are a multitude of claims between
parties too complicated for a jury an adjustment be made
in a suit for an accounting in equity.
That, in some instances, where an adjudication of differences between the same parties and involving the same
questions would require a multiplicity of actions at law,
the whole controversy may be brought into equity and
settled in a single suit.
And, in the exercise of its restraining jurisdiction, courts
of equity may issue injunctions:
To prevent a party who has fraudulently obtained a
judgment at law from enjoying its fruits.
To prevent threatened repetitions of trespasses upon
land.
To prevent the occupant of land from committing waste
thereon, which is a permanent injury to the prejudice of
the reversioner.
To prevent a threatened injury to property where the
injury, if committed, would be irreparable.
To prevent executive officers of a state from enforcing
a legislative act which is plainly unconstitutional and
void, and affects a large number of people in the enjoyment of their property.
In the foregoing subjects of litigation, the jurisdiction of
equity has long been firmly established, and no one doubts
or questions it.
We now come to another general class of matters, largely
incident to the rise of industrialism, in which the jurisdiction
of equity has been more or less seriously questioned, but in
which it has become fairly well recognized as being necessary
to the protection of rights that have come to be regarded
as property rights. Of course, there was an early recogni-
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tion of the right of the owner of land to have the air around
it and the streams flowing through it remain unpolluted by
human agency, and the quiet unbroken by unreasonable and
unnecessary noises, and the light unobscured. Invasion of
these rights which were incidental to ownership of land
directly depreciated its value and thus plainly was an injury
to property. But with the great multiplication of industries
and complexities of commercial transactions, and the relations between capital and labor, a new set of circumstances
arose in which the legal questions involved were not so easy
of solution. However, in a general way, it may safely be
said that equity will interfere in clear cases to prevent unfair
competition in business, it now being well established that
the business of a person, firm or corporation is property;
and it has been said that "Courts of equity no longer tolerate business tactics which amount to fraudulent or unfair
competition." A familiar instance is that in which one seeks
to avail himself of the benefit of an established favorable
reputation of goods made by another by falsely representing
his to be the same, either from substantial identity of distinguishing name, or by adopting another's trade mark. An
illustrative case on this point is American Waltham Watch
Co. v. United States Watch Co.' in which the plaintiff had
for many years manufactured. watches in the town otf
Waltham, Massachusetts, which had been called "Waltham
Watches" and had acquired a wide repute as such, and the
defendant had been using the name of the town on its
watches. The court enjoined the continuance of that deceptive practice. Another illustrative case is Yellow Taxi
Operating Co. v. Martin' in which the defendant sought to
profit by the reputation of the "Yellow Cab," by painting
their own cabs the same color with only such slight differences as would not be noticed by the general public. The
1 171 Mass. 85, 53 N. E. 141, 43 L. R. A. 826 (1899).
2 91 N. J. Eq. 233, 108 AUt. 763 (1919).
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court enjoined the practice. These two cases show that
equity will prevent unfair and fraudulent competition in
business. Equity, also, will enjoin a person from betraying
trade secrets of his former employer gained in such confidential relation.
The jurisdiction of equity in industrial strikes has been
vigorously asserted and violently disputed. There is some
divergence of judicial opinion, of course, but it may be
asserted with some degree of safety that courts of equity
will enjoin activities of strikers which result in physical
injury to the property of the employer. In the .matter of
boycotting, there is a twilight zone in the adjudications
which it would be profitless to enter here. It may be said,
however, that the right of labor to organize, and to quit
work or threaten to quit work in order to obtain better
terms or conditions is universally recognized by the courts;
and the corresponding right of the employer to hire and
discharge whom he will is also recognized.
In order to make clear -what is to follow, it seems appropriate to notice what is sometimes .called the "merger" of
law and equity. By 1616, the Court of Chancery had become firmly established in England, and soon thereafter its
jurisdiction had been extended to nearly its modern scope.
To a certain extent and little by little, the principles of
equity had rationalized and humanized the common law of
England, and it was inevitable that this process should go
on, but differences of mere procedure impeded its progress.
In Walsh on Equity,3 these difficulties are noticed with
admirable clarity, and he then says:
"No reason existed why law and equity should not be merged in a

single system with a single court and a common system of practice and

pleading, except the inertia and conservatism of bench and bar."

In the face of this hostility, however, New York became
the pioneer and, in 1848, enacted the Code of Civil Proced3 Sec. 7.
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ure, which has been substantially adopted in twenty-nine
other states of the Union, and in many other states there
exists what practically amounts to a merger. In New
Jersey, Delaware, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and
Tennessee separate courts of equity are still maintained.
In all other states and in all Federal Courts, equity and law
are administered by the same tribunal. All these codes substantially follow the New York Code, which provides as
follows:
"The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and
the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing are abolished;
and there shall be in this State hereafter but one form of action for the
enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress of private
wrongs which shall be denominated a civil action."

It will be observed that the foregoing provision relates
only to matters of form and procedure, not to the matter
of substance. Then came the Judicature Act of England,
enacted in 1873 and effective in 1875, by which it was provided that law and equity should be administered by a single
court but sitting in divisions. Significantly enough, this Act
provides that where there is a conflict between the Rules
of Common Law and the Rules of Equity with reference
to the same matter, the Rules of Equity shall prevail. So,
at last, equity had come into its own. The only reason for
noticing this matter of merger here is that some courts
apparently have thought the abolition of distinction of form
between law and equity had also extinguished the difference
in the nature and functions of the two systems, which, of
course, was impossible, and have employed equitable remedies in causes which were not essentially equitable, with
consequent confusion.
It is further necessary to bear in mind certain principles
relating to its jurisdiction and of universal application, except where modified or dispensed by statute. One of these
principles is that equity will never assume jurisdiction of
any controversy, if there is an adequate remedy at law.
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Another is that chancery itself has always declined to declare the exact boundaries of its own jurisdiction, for the
sufficient reason that, if it did, chicane and fraud would
operate just outside such boundary. Still another is that
equity has almost always refused to take any part in the
administration of the criminal law or of strictly political
questions, so that, on the whole, with few exceptions, equity
has confined itself strictly to the protection of property
rights. This jurisdiction has been enlarged by statute in
many states. In Pennsylvania it has been curtailed, for
in that state, equity has no jurisdiction except by statute.
The general rule is well stated by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of In Re Sawyer4 as follows:
"Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the distinction between common law and equity, as existing in England at the
time of the separation of the two countries, has been maintained, although both jurisdictions are vested in the same courts. (Citing cases.)
"The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by

express statute, are limited to the protection of rights of property. It
has no jurisdiction over the prosecution, the punishment, or the pardon
of crimes or misdemeanors, or over the appointment and removal of
public officers. To assume such a jurisdiftion or to sustain a bill in
equity to restrain or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of
offenses, or for the removal of public officers is to invade the domain of
the courts of common law, or of the executive and administrative department of the government." (Citing cases.)

No attempt will here be made to search out and state the
many modifications of this jurisdiction made by the
statutes of several states because this article is mainly confined to general trends. Some courts have gone beyond
the ancient landmarks of equity jurisdiction in response to
express statutory mandate, and. others apparently for
no better reason than a fine moral frenzy. In a few instances, courts of equity have lent their aid to the suppression of acts deemed criminal or immoral by them and thus,
by coining new crimes, have usurped legislative power. In
4

124 U. S. 200 (1887).
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still other cases, they have enjoined the commission of acts
denounced by the legislature as criminal, and, by holding
the violation of such injunctions to be contempt of court,
have created a potential excess of punishment over that
fixed by the legislature. We shall point out only a few of
such instances that, however, reveal some disquieting tendencies. In the main, we let the courts speak for themselves.
The first case to be specially considered is the Kentucky
case of Respass et al. v. Commonwealth5 in which the
court, on the motion of the Attorney General, restrained
the operation of a gambling poolroom in the city of Covington, when such operation was a crime under the Kentucky statute. In partial excuse for this decision, it should
be stated that a Kentucky statute makes it the duty of all
judges to "exercise all the powers vested in them for the
prevention of crimes and misdemeanors," and, also, that
the case was one of peculiar aggravation, as the State had
repeatedly prosecuted and convicted the defendants under
the criminal statute, but was unsuccessful in stopping the
criminal practice. The chief criticism of the case is that
it announces the novel doctrine that the state is the guardian of the morals of its people. Let the decision itself
speak:
"But it is earnestly insisted that the rule should not be applied to
nuisances which affect only the morals of the community. We cannot
see the force of this distinction. The state is interested in the character
of its people, no less than in their health or personal safety. The character of a state depends upon the character of the individuals constituting it. If the people become depraved, the state cannot long exist.
It may have wealth, it may have all that goes to make a great state,
and, yet, if its men are without character, it is a crumbling ruin. The
State is as much interested in restraining those things which destroy the
character of its people as in those things which destroy their health or
personal security."
5

131 Ky. 807, 115 S. W. 1131, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836 (1909).
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The foregoing contains some sound abstractions which
might well be addressed to the legislative branch of a government, but we are now considering the proper extent of
the jurisdiction of courts of equity. And in the syllabus
of this case, we find this.significant proposition:
"A nuisance which affects only the morals of a community can be
enjoined, as well as one affecting health or personal safety."
If the protection of the morals of a 'community is, in any
case, a legitimate function of the state, we suggest that it
should be performed by the legislative, not the judicial,
branch of government. Otherwise, the. differing opinions
of judges of what constitutes a menace to the morals of a
given community might and, likely, would lead to intolerable confusion and perpetual discord. It is quite true that,
in this Kentucky case, the court did not declare anything
to be immoral but what the legisature had already so denounced, and the sweeping statement of law in the syllabus
seems to be obiter. Nevertheless, it, like every other
judicial decision in this country, is a precedent upon which
other courts might justify their embarking upon the quixotic and perilous business of regulating private morals;
and such an exploit would be contrary to the genius of
American institutions.
The doctrine of this Kentucky case was denied in the
West Virginia case of State v. Ehrlick0 in which the court
refused an injunction to restrain a similar gambling crime
on the ground that the criminal law provided an adequate
remedy. For the same reason, an injunction was refused
in the case of State v. Vaughan.7 To the same effect is
State v. Scott.8 In State v. Vaughan the court said:
"It is demonstrably true that it is a sound principle of equity juris-

prudence that an injunction will not lie at the instance of the state to
restrain a public nuisance where the nuisance is one arising from the
6

64 S. E. 935 (W. Va. 1909).
7 81 Ark. 117, 98 S. W. 685, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899 (1906).
8 80 Conn. 317, 68 AtL 258 (1907).
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illegal, immoral, or pernicious acts of men, which, for the time being,
make the property devoted to such use a nuisance, where such nuisance is indictable and punishable under the criminal law. On the other
hand, if the public nuisance is one touching civil property rights or
privileges of the public, or the public health is affected by a physical
nuisance, or if any other ground of equity jurisdiction exists calling
for an injunction, a chancery court will enjoin notwithstanding the act
enjoined may also be a crime. The criminality of the act will neither
give nor oust jurisdiction in chancery."

To the same general effect as the foregoing Arkansas case
is the case of O'Brien v. Harris.9
We next examine the case of Ex Parte Warfield,10 but,
before doing so, should note that Texas is one of the states
where the jurisdiction of equity to grant injunctions has
been widely extended by statute. Sections 1 and 3 of
article 4642 of the present statute of that state provide
not only that courts may grant injunctions where the plaintiff shows himself entitled thereto "under the principles of
equity and the provisions of the statutes of this state relating to the granting of injunctions" but, also, simply "where
the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and such
relief or any part thereof requires the restraint of some
act prejudicial to him." With that statute in mind, we
read the Warfield case, which was a habeas corpus case
in which it was admitted that the prohibited act was committed, and the sole-question was whether equity had jurisdiction of the cause in which the injunction had been
granted. Morris, as plaintiff, had brought a suit against
Warfield in a Texas district court, seeking $100,000 damages for "partial alienation" of his wife's affections by Warfield, which, of course, was plainly an action at law. But,
in the same case, Morris asked for and obtained an injunction restraining Warfield "from visiting or associating with
plaintiff's wife, or going to or near her at a certain house,
No. 129 Marion street, or any other house or place in the
9 105 Ga. 732, 31 S. E. 745 (1898).
40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899).

10
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city of Dallas, or state of Texas, where said wife might be
and that he be restrained from writing or speaking to her,
or, in any manner, either directly or indirectly, communicating with her, by word, letter, writing, sign, or symbol."
The injunction was granted on the 23rd of February 1899
and served on defendant the next day. Between that date
and the 9th of the following month, Warfield violated this
injunction by going to the house at 129 Marion street,
which he claimed was his boarding house. For violating
this injunction Warfield was adjudged guilty of contempt
of court, and was assessed a fine of $100 and committed
to jail for three days. He then brought this action of habeas
corpus. In a long opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the district court had jurisdiction to grant
the injunction, that, hence, its violation constituted contempt of court, and that the judgment of contempt was
legal, and remanded Warfield to the custody of the sheriff,
basing its decision upon the statute referred to, saying that
the prohibited acts were "prejudicial" to plaintiff. It is
true that the court worked out a theory that the husband's
marital right to the affection and society of his wife constituted a property right, which a court of equity would
protect by injunction, but, nevertheless invoked the statute.
This Warfield case is interesting in view of the fact that it
was cited in the Ohio case to be noted in a dissenting opinion, and, also, because, after twenty-three years or more
experience with the enlarged jurisdiction to grant injunctions, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals rather sharply
criticised the practice. This was in the case of City of San
Antonio v. Schutte," decided in December 1922, where
equity had been invoked to restrain the violation of city
ordinances, relating to service cars operating on the streets
for hire. The trial judge had refused an injunction, and,
in affirming the decision, the Texas court said:
11

246 S. W. 413 (Tex. 1922).
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"A wave of reckless and promiscuous injunctions seems to be
sweeping all over Texas, and men are rushing into courts of equity to
obtain injunctions to restrain everything from the election of United
States Senators down to the nomination by a political party of precinct
officers -and the prevention of the execution of all kinds of laws and
city ordinances, and, if the execution of law can be prevented, the idea
will also obtain that injunctions will be excellent to enforce criminal
laws instead of resorting to courts of law for their enforcement. The
writ of injunction is intended and should be used as a strong arm of
courts of law, but it should not be used to usurp the prerogatives and
hamper the different branches of the state government in the exercise
of their constitutional functions. It was intended in its first conception,
and should be yet, as an aid to the courts in performing their duties,
and not to seize their power, or to be used by the courts to cripple or
hamper government in the discharge of its well-defined duties. It was
intended and should be used only to prevent irreparable injury to him
who seeks its aid, and not to destroy law, hamper justice or wreak
vengeance or malice on others. It is a protective and preventative
rather than a .restorative writ, and should not be used where the law
provides ample and-efficient means for the prevention and punishment
of crime and the preservation of rights."
We now approach the unique case of Snedaker v. King,1 2
decided in 1924, where the clash of judicial opinion on this
subject is especially well illustrated. Grace King, wife of
Homer King, filed a suit in the court of common pleas
against Miss Jessie L. Snedaker claiming $20,000 damages
for the "partial alienation" of her husband's affections, .and
asking that Miss Snedaker be restrained and enjoined
"from visiting or associating with plaintiff's husband, or
going to or near him at plaintiff's home or elsewhere, or at
any other house or place where said husband may be; that'
she be restrained and enjoined, either in person or through
.an agent or employee, or otherwse from writing or speaking to him, or, in any manner, either directly or indirectly,
communicating with him by word, letter, writing, sign or
symbol, or doing or causing to be done any act or thing
whatever preventing or tending to prevent plaintiff's husband from giving to plaintiff his love, affection, companion12

111 Oh. St. 225, 145 N. E. 1

(1924).
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ship, or conjugal relation, or support; that the defendant,
her agents or servants, be restrained from interfering with
the plaintiff in her peaceful efforts to speak, talk, write,
and communicate with her husband, and to regain his love,
esteem, support and conjugal relation, and that upon final
hearing the injunction be made perpetual." Thus the judicial arm of government was invoked to stifle the allurements made to a straying husband, and aid the wife to
regain his affections. This was a novel field for equity.
There was a trial to the court of common pleas, during
which the plaintiff waived all claims for damages except
for $5, and the court decided in her favor, and granted the
perpetual injunction she asked. But, on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Ohio, the judgment was reversed by a
majority of the court and the injunction dissolved. The
majority opinion so wisely discusses the question we copy
it entire:
"Per Curiam. The decree in this case is an extreme instance of gov-

ernment by injunction.'It attempts to govern, control and direct persoral relations and domestic affairs. Among other restrictions placed
upon the defendant by.this decree is that of remaining away from any
place where plaintiff's husband may be, and from interfering with
plaintiff's efforts tWcommunicate with her husband, and with her efforts
to regain his love, esteem, support and conjugal relation. It would be
only a little more extreme if the husband had been made a party defendant, and a mandatory injunction decreed requiring him to discharge all the duties of companionship, affection, love, and all other
obligations, legal and moral, assumed by him when he entered the
conjugal relation.
"Ample and adequate provision has been made by statute whereby
the plaintiff's husband may be required to discharge every obligation
imposed upon him by law, not only toward the plaintiff, but also in

behalf of their children. There is no averment that the husband has
failed in any of these particulars. In that respect, the injunction is based
upon the apprehension of plaintiff that ihe may in the future be deprived of support, by reason of the alleged alluring conduct of the

defendant toward plaintiff's husband.
"Such extension of the jurisdiction of equity to regulate and control
domestic relations, in addition to the legal and statutory remedies already provided, in our opinion is not supported by authority, warranted
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by sound reason, or in the interest of good morals or public policy. The
opening of such a wide field for injunctive process, enforceable only
by contempt proceedings, the difficulty if not impossibility of such enforcement, and the very doubtful beneficial results to be obtained
thereby, warrant the denial of such a decree in this case, and require
a modification of the judgment in that respect."

Judge Florence Allen, of that court, in a separate concurring opinion, made it clear that the court's decision did
not "condone" the acts of the defendant. And we, with
equal circumspection, here expressly disclaim such condonation.
Up to this point, the Ohio decision follows recognized
and long established principles of equity jurisprudence, but
we now turn to the dissenting opinion in the case as showing an ardent desire of the writer to depart from those
principles. We quote:
"Marshall, C. J. (dissenting). The statement of facts in the brief
per curiam opinion shows that this is a case where a lawful, dutiful
wife has invoked the aid of a court of equity to protect her marriage
contract, her home, and her little brood of infant children, against a
'vampire' who persists in her efforts to win the husband and father
from the performance of his duties to his home and family. It must be
kept clearly in mind in a discussion of this case that the husband is
not a party to the suit, and that the wife, Grace King, brings the action
solely against the vampire, Jessie L. Snedaker."

The Chief Justice then proceeds with his seven page dissenting opinion in an attempt to show that the power exists
in equity to make such an injunctive order "though it
should rarely be exercised." If this was a proper and salutary exercise of equity jurisdiction, and could, by any
chance, be made effective, there seems to be no reason why
it should be only "rarely" exercised. It should be stated that
the intermediate Court of Appeals of Ohio approved the
granting of the injunction.
It is refreshing to turn from the dissenting opinion in the
Ohio case, to the Illinois case of People v. Prouty,3 in which
13

262 Ill. 218, 104 N. E. 387 (1914).
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the lower court had added to a decree of divorce an injunction restraining both' parties from marrying again, within
the time prohibited by statute, unless they married each
other.. On the defendant being found guilty of contempt
of court in violating the injunction by marrying another
within four days after the decree, and sentenced to pay a
fine and suffer -imprisonment, he brought an action in
habeas corpus, and the -Illinois Supreme Court held that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction
and that it was a nullity. The facts were as follows: On
October 25, 1912, Carrie B. Prouty obtained the decree of
divorce and injunction in the lower court. On October 29,
1912, the defendant, Carlton Prouty married Mary Busscher in LaPorte, Indiana, thereby violating the order. The
sole question was whether the lower court had jurisdiction
to make the order. In holding that it had not, the Supreme
Court pointed out that the Illinois statute prohibited divorced persons from remarrying within one year after the
decree of divorce in ordinary cases, and fixing imprisonment
in the penitentiary for a violation of the statute, besides
declaring such remarriage void, thereby furnishing .an adequate remedy at law. In the fourth section of the syllabi,
the court states the following proposition of law:
"4. EQUITY. JURISDIcTION. A court of equity has no jurisdiction in
matters not involving property or civil rights, and no jurisdiction over
matters merely criminal, where no property rights are involved."
And in the body of the opinion, the Illinois court says:
"A court of equity exercising its general powers has no jurisdiction

over matters merely criminal or immoral, where no property rights are
involved. 'It is elementary law that the subject matter of the juris-

diction of the court of chancery is civil property. The court is conversant only with questions of property and the maintenance of civil
rights. Injury to property, whether actual or prospective, is the foun-

dation on which the jurisdiction rests. The court has no jurisdiction
in matters merely criminal or merely immoral which do not affect any
right to property.' Citing Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 III. 237. 'It is no part

of the mission of equity to administer the criminal law of the state or
to enforce the principles of religion and morality, -except so far as it may
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be incidental to the enforcement of property rights, and perhaps other
matters of equitable cognizance.'" (Citing Cope v. Fair Association of
Flora, 99 fI1. 489, 39 Am. Rep. 30.)

The Kansas City Court. of Appeals of Missouri, in Caskey
v. Edwards,4 used this forceful language in the syllabus:
"Equity cannot be turned into a criminal department, and the chancellor made to serve in the duties of the judge of the criminal court."

New York has followed the general rule, but not Without
a judicial struggle. In Baumann v. Baumann, the question
was considered at some length. The facts were these:
Berenice L. Baumann and Charles Ludwig Baumann. were
husband and wife from 1909 to 1921 when they executed
a separation agreement, he making provision for the support
of his wife and children and she releasing her dower rights,
when both were domiciled in the state of New York. Three
years later, he went to Mpxico, spent a month in that country, and returned with a document issued by an administrative official of the state of Yucatan purporting to
grant him a divorce. Two years later, the husband, accompanied by the defendant Ray Starr Einstein, also domiciled
in New York, drove to Connecticut and went through a
form of marriage with her. Thereafter they resided together in New York as husband and wife, he informing
acquaintances that he had obtained a divorce from his first
wife, and she assuming the title and claiming the position
of Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann. Thereupon, Berenice
L. Baumann brought suit against Charles and Ray to have
the Connecticut marriage declared null and void on the
ground that the Yucatan divorce was a nullity, and the
lower court so declared, but, also, enjoined the defendants
from representing or holding out that they are husband and
wife, and from representing or holding out that the defendant, Charles Ludwig Baumann, was divorced from the
14
15

128 Mo.App. 237 (1908).
250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).
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plaintiff, Berenice; also restraining the defendant, Ray
Starr Einstein, from assuming or using the name "Baumann.1; also restraining the defendants from going through
any marriage ceremony, or "attempting or purporting to
have performed any further marriage ceremony between
them," during the life of the plaintiff. This injunction part
of the decree was assailed as being beyond the equity jurisdiction of the court, and the New York Court of Appeals
sustained the, contention, reversing the lower court, two
of the eight judges dissenting. The pertinent syllabi of the

majority opinion reads:
"1. Equity will not award extraordinary relief of injunction except
where some legal wrong has been done or threatened, and where there
exists in the moving party some substantial right to be protected.
"3.

Equity cannot by injunction restrain conduct which merely

injures a person's feelings and causes mental anguish."
In the course of the majority opinion, the court says:
"It cannot be questioned that the conduct of the defendants is reprehensible. That it is illegal has been determined by the judgment herein. That it is socially and morally wrong may be conceded, and doubtless it is humiliating and annoying to the plaintiff. These considerations alone do not, however, justify -the granting of an injunction.
Equity cannot by injunction restrain conduct which merely injures a
person's feelings and causes mental anguish. (Citing cases.)
"The law does not remedy all social evils or moral wrongs . .
It is not the province of courts of equity to administer paternal relief
in domestic affairs. As a matter of practical fact, such decrees cannot
be enforced. That fact has long been recognized .... Attempts to
govern the morals of people by injunctions can only result in making
ridiculous the courts which grant such decrees."
Crane and O'Brien, JJ, dissented in separate opinions. As
showing the course of resoning adopted by Judge Crane,
which superficially appeals to one's sense of justice, we quote
from his dissent:
"It is said that the courts may declare the plaintiff to be the wife
of Charles Ludwig Baumann, but have no power to prevent another
person masquerading in the same locality in this position and relationship. I, for one, cannot understand the reason for such a limita-
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tion. Why should a court of equity be impotent in the face of what all
parties to this litigation concede to be wrong? I heartily agree that
courts of equity should not seek to make people better by injunction,
but I do consider it as much their business to protect a wife and mother
in her status before the public as in her property. Courts of equity
from time out of mind have made persons return property fraudulently
obtained; why should not a court of equity make this lady defendant
give up a pretended relationship and a name which she is falsely and
fraudulently using?"
In Judge O'Brien's dissenting opinion, he used the follow-

ing words:
"Something unsound appears to lie in a rule which would deny to
a court of equity the power to enjoin the masquerade of another's
name and title and the infringement of the mingled personal and property rights which include that name and constitute the matrimonial
status."

It might here be remarked that the criminal statutes of
New York were available to Mrs. Berenice Baumann to
put an end to a situation, which all the judges deemed
meretricious, without resorting to a court of equity. She,
therefore, had an adequate remedy at law.
We now notice a few grotesque injunctions which appear
to have been issued by various courts. These reports are
mere newspaper clippings assembled by Dean Pound, but
well illustrate the absurd and futile uses to which the writ
of injunction may be put. When considering them, it
should be borne in mind that the reports are not official,
and that the injunctions were likely only preliminary ones
which were probably dissolved on final hearing. Here they
are:

"Boston. 1920. Judge Lawton of the Superior Court today ordered
an injunction to issue restraining Mrs. Tillie Feldman from making
any 'rude or improper faces, grimaces, or jeering or scoffing' at Mrs.
Minnie Freedman, a Boston milliner. ...
"Mrs. Tillie Feldman, who formerly lived at Harrison avenue and
Davis street, must not, by court order, make any more faces at her
one-time neighbor and friend, Mrs. Minnie Freedman of 319 Riverway. This court order was given by Judge Lawton in the equity motion
session after a long recital of the spite and jealousy-marked feud be-
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tween the two women. The injunction, in full, restrains Mrs. Feldman
from going to Mrs. Freedman's home, from in any way harassing or
molesting her, from going to her place of business, from telephoning
to her personally, from coming in contact with her personally in public,
by using any form of language or by making any improper faces or
grimaces."
"New York. May 19. For the first time in the history of the New
Jersey courts, an order has been issued restraining a lovesick rejected
suitor from committing suicide on the doorstep of the jilter's home.
"Boston. 1925. Charles Sklar of Dorchester yesterday obtained
a temporary injunction which forbids Frank Mulvey, also of Dor"chester, to enter Sklar's home or threaten, communicate with, touch
or otherwise interfere with his wife, Bertha Sklar, or the two Sklar
children, Ida, 5, and David, 2. The temporary injunction was issued
by an agreement of counsel, pending a 'hearing on Sklar's bill in
equity ....
.
"New York. 1924. Argument was heard yesterday by Federal
Judge Bondy on a motion made by counsel for Frank C. Clark, a conductor of vacation tours, for the dismissal of an action begun by his
former wife, Estelle M. Clark, for the annulment of a Reno divorce
obtained by Mr. Clark in the fall of 1918. Mrs. Clark's complaint also
asks that Mr. Clark be restrained from living with his present wife.
...

Decision was reserved by Judge Bondy."

Final disposition of this Clark case appears in Clark v.
Clark16 from which it may be inferred that Judge Bondy
refused the injunction.
"Springfield, Mass. Dec. 20. Judge Wallace R. Heady in District
Court this afternoon issued an injunction against all love affairs between Mrs. Gladys Thompson, 26, of 31 Myrtle street, and William
E. Beach, 37, of 86 Mill street. She was ordered to go away with her
husband, Daniel F. Thompson of Indianapolis, Ind., and forget all
about Beach."
"Chicago, July 3, 1928. An injunction issued by Judge Sabath
today restrains R, Paul Weingarten, President of the Underwriters'
Finance Company, from taking his son, Paul Jr. six years old, on airplane trips. Clarence Darrow, in behalf of Mrs. Gertrude Weingarten,
the boy's mother, recently divorced, asked for the injunction, pleading
that the father was endangering the life of his son. 'Junior is just like
his dad,' Mr. Weingarten said, opposing his ex-wife's plea. 'He gets a
thrill out of flying. Airplanes are no longer dangerous. I've been going
16 11 Fed. (2d) 871 (1926).
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up since I was Captain in the A. E. F. It's in the boy's blood. He's
always begging for a ride.' 'He's nervous and can't sleep after the trips,'
said Mrs. Weingarten. Judge Sabath ruled the boy was too young."

Other instances are noted in the collection made by Dean
Pound, but these will be sufficient for present purposes, and
speak for themselves. They may be contrasted with the
rule regarding equity jurisdiction laid down in Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence 17 as follows:
"The rules which define these rights and determine the powers of
husbands over their wives, parents over their children, guardians over
their wards, masters over their servants, belong exclusively to the domain of law. It is only when some property rights or questions concerning property arise between husband and wife, parent and child, guardian
and ward, that equity can possibly have jurisdiction, and even in such
cases the jurisdiction does not extend to merely personal relations."

It should be observed that not only are the major crimes
prohibited by law, but, also, abuses in domestic relations,
and that, therefore, there is no necessity to resort to equity,
the remedy at law being adequate. The legislative prohibitions, under penalty, constitute an injunction upon all
persons within the legislative jurisdiction. The intrusion
of the preventive jurisdiction of equity into the domain of
criminal law is challenged, by the opponents of such intrusion, upon the general grounds:
That, by this means, courts of equity may enlarge the
scope of existing criminal statutes, and, by their judgments for contempt, increase the penalties thereof, thereby usurping legislative power.
That such courts could even create entirely new
offenses unknown to the legislature.
That defendants would be deprived of their constitutional right of trial by jury.
That thus, courts of equity may become an effective
instrument of tyranny, and the liberty of the citizens
17

Sec. 99 (4th. ed.).
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come to depend upon the arbitrary and varying caprice
of the judge.
To these objections, the soothsaying advocates of such
an enlargement of equity jurisdiction, in effect, make reply:
That, even though it involves a confusion of the legislative with the judicial functions of government, if and
when exercised "for the general welfare and the benefit
of humanity," though a departure from our theory of
"checks and balances," it is salutary. On the same
reasoning, an absolute monarchy can be fully justified.
That the right of trial by jury exists only as to crimes
actually committed, not to those threatened to be committed in the. future,' which equity merely prevents.
Superficially, that seems an adequate answer, but when
one remembers that, by enlarging old crimes and coining
new ones coupled with the device of penalties for contempt of court, the defendant is, in fact, deprived of his
right of trial by jury for a criminal offense.
It should not be forgotten that, in most states, so-called
"Peace Warrant" statutes exist which cover many prospective crimes, and furnish a complete legal remedy.
In a general way, the foregoing indicates the various
contentions that are being made in favor of and in opposition to the extension of equity jurisdiction into the domain
of criminal law. To us, the objections to such extension
seem more sound that the excuses for it. At all events, the
novel excursion has been sternly checked by the overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in the United States.
Of course, equity has been invoked, too, in purely political matters, such as the arranging of ballots, holding of
elections, and the actions of political committees. We take
a glance at a very few of these attempts, and at what some
courts said of them.
A case illustrative of this invasion of equity into the
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realm of politics is that of Neal v. Young."8 Neal brought
an injunction suit against Young and others constituting
the state Democratic committee to restrain the defendants
from interfering with a primary election called and arranged for by the county Democratic committee, and the
injunction was granted. What was involved was purely a
political contest between the Democratic committee of
Jefferson county and the Democratic committee of the
state of Kentucky. The county committee had called a
primary election to nominate circuit judges, circuit clerks
and other officers, whereupon the state committee adopted
a resolution forbidding the holding of the election. Then
the injunction was issued upon the application of the county
committee. Defendants expressly raised the point that the
granting of the injunction was beyond the equity powers
of the court. In reply, the court said:
"It was urged in argument that the question here involved is purely
a political one, and that the courts should not take jurisdiction of it.
My answer is that the court of appeals has a contrary opinion, and
Eagan v. Gerwe, Brown v. Republican County Committee, and Young

v. Beckman held that it had jurisdiction to enforce individual and legal
rights .... The necessity for such adjudications has been placed

upon the courts by the changes which have been made in the organic
and statutory law of the state."
The almost universal rule is against the doctrine, and is
well stated in the footnotes at page 1379 of 33 A. L. R. as
follows:
"In 14 R. C. L. sec. 76 of the article on Injunctions, it is stated

that a court of equity will not grant an injunction to protect a person
in the enjoyment of a political right, or assist him in acquiring such
right, as that court has no jurisdiction in matters of a political nature,
for, while political rights are as sacred as rights to personal liberty

and property, yet they are properly within the jurisdiction of the
courts of law."
The case of Scurry v. Nicholson 9 is interesting on this
point. There .Nicholson brought suit for an injunction to
Is 75 S. W. 1082 (Ky. 1903).

19 9 S.W. (2d) 747 (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas 1928).
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restrain the Democratic county executive committee from
ousting him from its membership, which it did because he,
though calling himself a Democrat, had refused to take
the pledge prescribed by the committee to support the
Democratic presidential and vice-presidential nominees.
The lower court had granted a temporary injunction, but
the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the
lower court and denied the injunction, saying in syllabi:
"In absence of statutory power, courts cannot interfere with judgments of committees and tribunals of established political parties in
matters involving party government and discipline, such as regularity
of conventions, nominations of candidates, and constitution of committees."
We venture to quote an interesting part of the court's
opinion thus:
"Injunctive relief is granted by the courts on equitable grounds only,
and it is a maxim of equity that 'he who comes into a court of equity
must come with clean hands.' Can it be said that one, who in a Democratic primary seeks a position as a committeeman, and who refused
to take the test of fealty required by the primary law, or takes it with a
mental reservation, to ignore it if he chooses, and who later openly
avows himself opposed to the nominees of the party as made by its
highest authorities, and actively aligns himself with the forces of an
antagonistic and opposing party, is a person having clean political
hands and entitled to honors in the Democratic executive party organization and to the interposition of the courts? We think not."
The Nebraska case of Winnett v. Adams 20 has been
widely followed by courts and cited by text writers as expressing the true rule, as follows:
"1. A civil right is a right accorded to every member of a district,
community or nation. A political right is one exercisable in the administration of government.
"2. A court of equity will not-undertake to supervise the acts and
management of a political party for the protection of a purely political
right."
And, in the course of the opinion, Commissioner Albert
said:
20

71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 681 (1904).
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"Notwithstanding the array of authorities which support it, we
should not care to commit ourselves unqualifiedly to the doctrine that
a court of equity will not under any circumstances interfere for the
protection of political rights. But we think it perfectly safe to adopt
the doctrine to the extent of holding that a court of equity will not
undertake to supervise the acts and management of a political party,
for the protection of a purely political right. We do not overlook the
fact that primary elections have become the subject of legislative regulation, and it may be conceded that each member of a political party
has a right to a voice in such primaries, and to seek nomination for
public office at the hands of his party. But when he is denied these
rights, or unreasonably hampered in their exercise, he must look to
some other source than a court of equity for redress. To hold otherwise would establish what could not but prove a most mischievous
precedent, and would be a long step in the direction of making a court
of equity a committee on credentials, and the final arbitrator between
contesting delegations in political conventions. The voters themselves
are competent to deal with such matters without the guiding hand of
the chancellor, and it will make for their independence, self-reliance and
ability for self-government to permit them to do so. It is true, they may
make mistakes, but courts themselves have been known to err."

Of course, when it comes to certain matters relating to
public officers and their duties and right to hold offices, the
citizen is by no means remediless, for he has such strictly
legal remedies as quo warranto, mandamus and the like.
We are discussing only the jurisdiction of courts of equity
in this article. And, in most states, there are ample statutory provisions in regard to elections.
One of the causes of the increasing resort to courts of
equity is the growing disgust with the jury system. To
some extent in many localities the defects in that system
are due to political considerations which affect the selection
of the jury panels. Then the verdicts of juries are too
often the result of bizarre notions of justice, impatience
with the law, and a variety of idiosyncrasies largely of an
emotional nature. Frequently, the jury's idea of the proper
measure of damages is based solely upon the plaintiff's
tears and the defendant's fortune. And, in murder cases,
it is well known that the beauty of the female defendant
quite generally furnishes the only ground for a verdict of
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acquittal. Of course, no such cases can be brought into
equity, but they illustrate the tendency to avoid jury trials,
if possible.. Then, at rare intervals, there arise situations
of extreme gravity, where the ordinary processes of the
law have proved wholly inadequate to abate acts made
criminal by statute, and the aid of equity has been sought.
Such a case is Stead v. Fortner2 1 which was an information
by the attorney general to abate a nuisance consisting of
the continued operation of a saloon, in dry territory, under
a pretended license issued by city officials without authority. The facts in the case were that the town and city of
Shelbyville, under an option act of the Illinois legislature,
had voted against saloons, notwithstanding which the city
council had issued a license for the sale of intoxicating
liquors to the defendant, Fortner, and he had been operating under it for several years. Criminal informations had
been filed against him, but the county judge had refused
to issue warrants; lists of witnesses, who would testify to
sales of liquor by Fortner, were presented to grand juries
with request that such witnesses be called, and, if the evidence was sufficient, indictments should be returned against
persons violating the law; but each grand jury refused to
hear witnesses, or consider the evidence, or return any
indictment. After these fruitless efforts at law the attorney
general resorted to equity, and the court sustained him
In the syllabus, the court made a somewhat sweeping statement of the jurisdiction of equity in such matters, which
was later modified in City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal
Co.2 2 in the following language:

"The power of courts of equity to abate or enjoin the continuance
of a nuisance, either public or private, is of recent origin and will be
exercised only in extreme cases, at least until after the right and the
question of nuisance has been settled at law."
21 255 IL 468, 99 N. E. 680 (1912).
22 260 M. 111, 102 N. E. 992 (1913).
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In both this Stead case and the Kentucky case of Respass,'.supira,it will be seen that the information was by the
attorney general and only after the criminal laws and officers had failed to stop the criminal practice. In such emergencies, it is possible for courts of equity to assume a jurisdiction they would otherwise decline. In-some states there
are statutes giving the governor power to remove a faithless public official summarily, and, in such states, of course,
there is no occasion to resort to equity.
The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Illinois on this subject seems to be that in the case of State v.
Brush,2 decided in October, 1925, which was a proceeding
to reverse a conviction for contempt in violating an injunction against using a certain place for dealing in intoxicating
liquor contrary to the Prohibition Law of Illinois. The
proof showed that the defendant had intoxicating liquor
in his possession, but at a place different from the one described in the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, which it would seem it might have done for
the reason that it appeared that the injunction had hot
been violated at the place proscribed, but the court went
on to notice the case of Stead v. Fortner,supra, and others
like it, and said:
"Injury to property or civil rights is the foundation of the jurisdiction of courts of equity, and it is not within their province, in general, to enforce the criminal law or the principles of morality. People
v. Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N. E. 387, 51 LRA (N. S.) 1140, Ann.
Cas. 1915B. 155; Cope v. Fair Ass'n, 99 Ill. 489, 39 Am. Rep. 30;
Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237. Equity has jurisdiction, however, to
abate public nuisances, although those engaged in their maintenance
are amenable to the criminal law, and although no question of damage
to property is involved, on the ground that there has been an invasion
of public rights and that the public safety and morality are concerned.
Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 680."

It might be a fair summary of the Illinois decisions to
say that, in that state, equity will enjoin a threatened viola23

318 I1. 307, 149 N. E. 262 (1925).
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tion of a criminal statute only in cases of extreme aggravation where the law has been vainly invoked, or where
express statutory authority exists.
We have now indicated that there is a substantial enlargement of equity jurisdiction in some states, some of
which is manifestly necessary and wholesome, some of
doubtful validity and some entirely absurd and even fantastic. From all this, what are the implications?
Since earliest times, it has been the special concern of
courts of equity that their decrees should be effective, ,and
they frequently refuse to grant them for no other reason
than that it would be a vain thing and thereby bring the
court into disrepute. So it is that nearly all courts of equity
decline to attempt to direct and control domestic relations,
well knowing that such attempt would be nugatory. Common sense alone would seem to require that, in such
matters, equity remit the parties to their numerous remedies provided by law. Even a court of equity, with all
its powers, is impotent to restore to a spouse that love of
which he or she has been bereft, or to restrain the iniquitous approach of sheik or vampire. And to attempt to do
so is manifestly absurd, besides being a wide departure
from established equitable principles and an encroachment
upon theI domain of courts of law.
One of the causes of the extension of equity jurisdiction
is the widespread belief that it is a duty of the State to
impose good moral behavior by legal force. This strange
recrudescence of a long abandoned notion has manifested
itself chiefly in legislation, but, at last, has appeared in the
judiciary. Consider the rhetorical outburst of the Kentucky
court in declaring that the morals of the people are no less
the concern of the state than their health and safety. That
is followed by a truism, which no one denies, that, if the
people decay, the state will not long endure. But is it a
legitimate function of government in this country to at-
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tempt to bolster up a tottering morality by judicial ukase?
And, even if the proposal were sound, how .effective could
it be made? If the teachings of religion prove inadequate,
can law compass the desired end? If persuasion fails, will
force succeed? It never has. Will it now? Of course, there
are those "progressive" souls, who possess the fond delusion that, since there has been" so great invention in the
realm of material things, a corresponding advance can be
forced in the field of morals, ignoring the fact that a human
being differs from a machine. And, moreover, to the wellintentioned zealot impatient of ordinary means, there is
fascination in the thought that the forceful agencies of
government can bring about that millenium he so ardently
desires. Always, they envision "the dawn of a new day,"
which is an inspiring concept, but it should be borne in
mind that nothing can work more havoc than a superb
moralistic conviction working through civic force. In such
cases nobility of purpose has never been any assurance
against disaster of result. And, certainly, it seems most
unwise for. equity to embark upon a perilous and uncharted
sea. For example, the writer disbelieves in so-called "companionate marriage," regarding it only as a transparent
pretense to legalize concubinage; but he would not think
of making application to a court of equity to enjoin it,
preferring to wait for legislative action or until some common law judge holds such a relation to be no marriage at
all, in which event, of course, the parties would be subjected
to all the penalties of the criminal code. Then, too, the
proposal that equity invade the domain of private morals
is a direct denial of the theory of personal moral responsibility, which is believed to be common to all moral philosophies. Hitherto, it has been thought that this responsibility
could not be transferred to the State, which the notion of
a paternalistic supervision of moral behavior contemplates.
Such a thing is repugnant to American institutions, and, if
put into operation, would destroy that "domestic tranquil-

EXTENSION OF EQUITY JURISDICTION

lity," which was one of the declared purposes for the founding of the government. It is bad enough to witness its
working in legislative halls, but, in courts of equity, it is
intolerable. Still, it is consoling to reflect that, at present,
it amounts to only a trend, and not a substantial menace,
for, in nearly all cases, the judges have successfully resisted
the pressure. They have realized that their office did not
give them a sort of plenary commission "to put down"
what they might conceive to be "wrong," individual moral
behavior. And, as the New York judge remarked, if they
did this, they would have little time for anything else, for,
if once the door be opened, it will be crowded. It goes
without saying that it is much to be desired that the people
should be raised to higher levels of thought and conduct,
but the idea that the means employed should be force instead of persuasion is one that the history of the centuries
condemns as both futile and perilous.
By patient thought, through the centuries, chancellors
have evolved certain established principles of equity
founded upon natural justice, the application of which has
proved benign. If, as the late Chief Justice Taft observed,
the administration of our criminal law. is a disgrace to this
Republic, its equity jurisprudence is its abiding glory. With
few exceptions, the chancellors of the past might rise and
confidently demand of history to say whether they have
worthily borne the Great Seal of their Sovereign.
William M. Cain.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.

